Profit with Purpose? A Theory of Social Enterprise

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150495
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 19-58
• 关键词: private provision; public-goods; incentives; COMPETITION; motivation; GOVERNMENT; OWNERSHIP; ECONOMICS

摘要

When social benefits cannot be measured, an organization that selects managers based on pro-social motivation can be used to balance profits with a social purpose. This paper develops a model of social enterprise based on selection of citizen-managers to run firms with flexible missions. We analyze organizational choice between social enterprise, for-profits, and nonprofits. The paper also develops the implications of matching between founders and managers based on their preferences for the mission.