Financial Incentives, Hospital Care, and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Fair Pricing Laws

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Batty, Michael; Ippolito, Benedic
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160060
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 28-56
• 关键词: Medicare; insurance; IMPACT; bankruptcy; ECONOMICS; demand

摘要

State laws that limit how much hospitals are paid by uninsured patients provide a unique opportunity to study how financial incentives of health care providers affect the care they deliver. We estimate the laws reduce payments from uninsured patients by 25-30percent. Even though the uninsured represent a small portion of their business, hospitals respond by decreasing the amount of care delivered to these patients, without measurable effects on a broad set of quality metrics. The results show that hospitals can, and do, target care based on financial considerations, and suggest that altering provider financial incentives can generate more efficient care.