A Macroeconomic Approach to Optimal Unemployment Insurance: Theory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Landais, Camille; Michaillat, Pascal; Saez, Emmanuel
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Brown University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150088
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 152-181
• 关键词: social insurance; search; HEALTH; equilibrium; consumption; EFFICIENCY; happiness; COSTS

摘要

This paper develops a theory of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in matching models. The optimal UI replacement rate is the conventional Baily-Chetty replacement rate, which solves the trade-off between insurance and job-search incentives, plus a correction term, which is positive when an increase in UI pushes the labor market tightness toward its efficient level. In matching models, most wage mechanisms do not ensure efficiency, so tightness is generally inefficient. The effect of UI on tightness depends on the model: increasing UI may raise tightness by alleviating the rat race for jobs or lower tightness by increasing wages through bargaining.