Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidatest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Granzier, Riako; Pons, Vincent; Tricaud, Clemence
• 署名单位: Uber Technologies, Inc.; Harvard University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20210840
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 177-217
• 关键词: regression discontinuity design; incumbency advantage; voting-behavior; majority-rule; INFORMATION; ELECTIONS; MODEL; polls; underdog; turnout

摘要

Candidates' placements in polls and past elections can be powerful coordination devices for parties and voters. Using a regression discontinuity design in French two-round elections, we show that candidates who place first in the first round are more likely to stay in the race and win than those who placed second. These effects are even larger for ranking second versus third, and also present for third versus fourth. They stem from allied parties agreeing on which candidate should drop out, voters coordinating their choice, and the bandwagon effect of wanting to vote for the winner. We find similar results across 19 other countries.