The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Fergusson, Leopoldo; Robinson, James; Romero, Dario; Vargas, Juan F.
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); University of Chicago; Columbia University; Universidad del Rosario
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180168
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1-43
• 关键词: Contracts; counterinsurgency; teachers; aid

摘要

We investigate the use of high-powered incentives for the Colombian military and show that this practice produced perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as false positives). There were significantly more false positives during the period of high-powered incentives in municipalities with weaker judicial institutions and where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels, who have stronger career concerns than generals. In municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the high-powered incentives period also coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in overall security.