Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gulino, Giorgio; Masera, Federico
• 署名单位: University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20210446
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 218-251
• 关键词: news; ENFORCEMENT; GOVERNMENT; leadership; BEHAVIOR; culture

摘要

Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by study-ing whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermar-ket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behav-ior by underreporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16 percent after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incen-tives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.