Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Boyer, M. Martin; De Donder, Philippe; Fluet, Claude; Leroux, Marie-Louise; Michaud, Pierre-Carl
署名单位:
Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Laval University; University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
ISSN/ISSBN:
1945-7731
DOI:
10.1257/pol.20180227
发表日期:
2020
页码:
134-169
关键词:
health-insurance
Annuities
demand
Heterogeneity
MARKETS
welfare
CHOICE
needs
摘要:
This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses, while selection plays little role.
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