Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johannesen, Niels; Langetieg, Patrick; Reck, Daniel; Risch, Max; Slemrod, Joel
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180410
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 312-346
• 关键词: long

摘要

In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.