Criminal Deterrence when There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras. Vehicular Accidents. and Public Safety

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gallagher, Justin; Fisher, Paul J.
• 署名单位: Montana State University System; Montana State University Bozeman; University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170674
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 202-237
• 关键词: red-light cameras; fatal crashes; ENFORCEMENT; installation; transit

摘要

Numerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries.