Financial Education versus Costly Counseling: How to Dissuade Borrowers from Choosing Risky Mortgages?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Agarwal, Sumit; Amromin, Gene; Ben-David, Itzhak; Chomsisengphet, Souphala; Evanoff, Douglas D.
署名单位：
National University of Singapore; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7731
DOI：
10.1257/pol.20150313
发表日期：
2020
页码：
1-32
关键词：
摘要：
This paper explores the effects of mandatory third-party review of mortgage contracts on consumer choice. The study is based on a legislative pilot carried out in Illinois in 2006, under which mortgage counseling was triggered by applicant credit scores or by their choice of risky mortgages. Low-credit score applicants for whom counselor review was mandatory did not materially alter their contract choice. Conversely, higher credit score applicants who could avoid counseling by choosing nonrisky mortgages did so, decreasing their propensity for high-risk contracts between 10 and 40 percent. In the event, one of the key goals of the legislation-curtailment of high-risk mortgage products-was only achieved among the population that was not counseled.
来源URL：