Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor Demand: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Administrative Data

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnston, Andrew C.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Merced
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190031
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 266-293
• 关键词: Payroll tax; duration; benefits; DESIGN; EMPLOYMENT; BEHAVIOR; layoffs; LEVEL

摘要

To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.