Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bazzi, Samuel; Hanson, Gordon; John, Sarah; Roberts, Bryan; Whitley, John
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190291
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1-27
• 关键词: immigration enforcement; self-selection; us border; migration

摘要

During the 2008 to 2012 period, the US Border Patrol enacted new sanctions on migrants apprehended while attempting to enter the United States illegally. Using administrative records on apprehensions of Mexican nationals that include fingerprint-based IDs and other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to penalties and if he is later reapprehended. Exploiting plausibly random variation in the rollout of sanctions, we estimate econometrically that exposure to penalties reduced the 18-month reapprehension rate for males by 4.6 to 6.1 percentage points off of a baseline rate of 24.2 percent. These magnitudes imply that sanctions can account for 28 to 44 percent of the observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions. Further results suggest that the drop in recidivism was associated with a reduction in attempted illegal entry.