Who Benefits When Firms Game Corrective Policies?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reynaert, Mathias; Sallee, James M.
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190019
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 372-412
• 关键词: fuel-economy; efficiency standards; pass-through; energy; COSTS; prices; INFORMATION; CONSEQUENCES; valuation; emissions

摘要

Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that determines policy. This harms buyers by eroding information, but it benefits them when cost savings are passed through into prices. We develop a model that highlights this tension and use it to analyze gaming of automobile carbon emission ratings in the EU. We document startling increases in gaming using novel data. We then analyze the effects of gaming in calibrated simulations. Over a wide range of parameters, we find that pass-through substantially outweighs information distortions; on net, buyers benefit from gaming, even when they are fooled by it.