Market Power and Income Taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kaplow, Louis
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200103
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 329-354
• 关键词: imperfect competition; UNITED-STATES; monopoly; tax; DYNAMICS; markups; entry; COSTS; MODEL; RISK

摘要

This article analyzes concerns about market power and inequality in a model with multiple sectors, heterogeneous abilities, endogenous labor supply, and nonlinear income taxation. Proportional markups with no profit dissipation have no effect on the economy, and a policy that reduces a nonproportional markup raises (lowers) welfare when it is higher (lower) than a weighted average of other markups. With proportional (partial or full) profit dissipation, proportional markups are equivalent to a downward shift of the distribution of abilities, and the optimal policy rule with nonproportional markups maximizes consumer plus producer surplus despite concerns for distribution and labor supply distortion.