Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy, and Training

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banerjee, Abhijit; Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra; Duflo, Esther; Keniston, Daniel; Singh, Nina
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Calcutta; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190664
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 36-66
• 关键词: management matter; CORRUPTION; CONTRACTS

摘要

Management matters for firms, but what practices are optimal in hierarchical government organizations? And can skilled managers identify them? A large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, tested four interventions recommended by senior police officers: limitations of transfers, rotation of duties and days off, increased community involvement, and on-duty training. Field experience motivated a fifth intervention: decoy visits by enumerators to register cases, incentivizing staff to improve service. Only training and decoy visits had robust impacts; others were poorly implemented and ineffective. Management reforms can improve policing, but even skilled leaders struggle to identify the optimal interventions.