Optimal Regulation of E-cigarettes: Theory and Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Allcott, Hunt; Rafkin, Charlie
• 署名单位: Microsoft; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200805
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1-50
• 关键词: products; benefits; smoking; tobacco; demand; restrictions; association; addiction; prices; SYSTEM

摘要

We model optimal e-cigarette regulation and estimate key param-eters. Using tax changes and scanner data, we estimate relatively elastic demand. A demographic shift-share identification strategy suggests limited substitution between e-cigarettes and cigarettes. We field a new survey of public health experts who report that vap-ing is more harmful than previously believed. In our model's aver-age Monte Carlo simulation, these results imply optimal e-cigarette taxes are higher than recent norms. However, e-cigarette subsidies may be optimal if vaping is a stronger substitute for smoking and is safer than our experts report, or if consumers overestimate the health harms from vaping. (JEL D12, D18, D61, H21, H23, I12, I18)