Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fryer, Roland G.; Levitt, Steven D.; List, John; Sadoff, Sally
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190287
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 269-299
• 关键词: leveraging behavioral economics; pay experimental-evidence; performance pay; student-achievement; market experience; prospect-theory; DESIGN; randomization; CONTRACTS; outcomes

摘要

In a field experiment, we provide financial incentives to teachers framed either as gains, received at the end of the year, or as losses, in which teachers receive up-front bonuses that must be paid back if their students do not improve sufficiently. Pooling two waves of the experiment, loss-framed incentives improve math achievement by an estimated 0.124 standard deviations (Sigma), with large effects in the first wave and no effects in the second wave. Effects for gain-framed incentives are smaller and not statistically significant, approximately 0.051 Sigma. We find suggestive evidence that the effects on teacher value added persist posttreatment.