Hassle Costs versus Information: How Do Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduce Opioid Prescribing?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alpert, Abby; Dykstra, Sarah; Jacobson, Mireille
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Amazon.com; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200579
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 87-123
• 关键词: health-insurance; overdose deaths; plan choice; laws reduce; Take-up; physicians; IMPACT; STATES; RISK; restrictions

摘要

We study hassle costs versus information provision in explaining how prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) decrease opioid prescribing. PDMPs aim to reduce opioid prescribing through information provision but may also unintentionally affect prescribing through the hassle of required record checks. We analyze Kentucky's landmark PDMP to disentangle these two mechanisms. Hassle costs reduce opioid prescribing across the board, including to opioid-naive patients; however, physicians continue to prescribe opioids to patients who would benefit the most. Although information also affects prescribing, hassle costs explain the majority of the decline. Introducing a cost to prescribing high -risk medications improves the targeting of treatment. (JEL H75, I11, I12, I18, L65)