How Do Copayment Coupons Affect Branded Drug Prices and Quantities Purchased?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dafny, Leemore; Ho, Kate; Kong, Edward
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard Medical School
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220355
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 314-346
• 关键词: medicare part d; multiple-sclerosis; COMPETITION; cost; DISCRIMINATION

摘要

We estimate the causal effects of drug copayment coupons, , which reduce consumer cost sharing for branded prescription drugs, on net-of-rebate price and quantities sold. We show that coupon introductions increase the quantity of drugs without generic substitutes sold by 23-25 - 25 percent for the commercial segment relative to Medicare Advantage, , where coupons are banned. To quantify the resulting equilibrium price effects, we estimate a discrete choice model of demand for multiple sclerosis drugs and simulate a model of drug price negotiations. We estimate that net-of-rebate prices are 8 percent higher due to coupons being offered for most of these drugs.