Tripping through Hoops: The Effect of Violating Compulsory Government Procedures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Emanuel, Natalia; Ho, Helen
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220331
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 290-313
• 关键词: deterrence; FAILURE; crime

摘要

Millions of Americans must navigate complex government procedures under the threat of punishment. Violating these requirements can lead to poverty traps or deepening legal system involvement. We use a field experiment to estimate the effect of failing to appear for court on subsequent legal contact. The treatments reduce failure to appear by 40 percent. Using treatment assignment to identify the causal impact of minor procedural violations, we find no effect on arrests. However, for lower-level cases, violations increase fines and fees paid by 59 percent or $79, equivalent to a high-interest loan, showing that minor procedural violations can be costly. ( JEL C93, D73, K14, K41)