Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lotti, Clarissa; Muco, Arieda; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Valletti, Tommaso
署名单位：
University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Imperial College London
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7731
DOI：
10.1257/pol.20220357
发表日期：
2024
页码：
347-366
关键词：
摘要：
Centralization of public procurement can lower prices for the government's direct purchase of goods and services. This paper focuses on indirect savings. Public administrations that do not procure directly through a central procurement agency might benefit from the availability of centrally procured goods. We exploit the introduction of a central purchasing agency in Italy and find that prices came down by 22 percent among administrations that bought autonomously. These indirect effects appear to be driven by informational externalities, , especially for less competent public buyers purchasing technologically more complex goods. Accounting for indirect savings increases the estimate of direct ones. ( JEL D83, H57, H83) )
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