Optimal Internality Taxation of Product Attributes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gerster, Andreas; Kramm, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; RWI - Leibniz Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Ifo Institut; University of Cologne; Dortmund University of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220416
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 394-419
• 关键词: plan choice; POLICY

摘要

This paper explores how a benevolent policymaker should optimally tax ( or subsidize) ) product attributes when consumers are behaviorally biased. We demonstrate that market choices are informative about biases, , which can be exploited for targeting biased consumers via a nonlinear tax schedule. We show that the properties of this schedule depend on few parameters of the joint distribution of consumer valuations and biases. Furthermore, , we provide a novel justification for behaviorally motivated product standards and derive when a combination of taxes and standards is optimal. We illustrate our findings based on a numerical example from the lightbulb market. ( JEL D82, D91, H21, H25, L69) )