Optimal Intermediary Rents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schroth, Josef
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20140043
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 98-118
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; moral hazard; externalities; equilibrium; insurance; banking; RISK

摘要

This paper studies a dynamic production economy with financial intermediation. It is assumed that claims held on intermediaries cannot be fully enforced such that intermediation is subject to intermediary equity requirements. It is shown that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient whenever the aggregate amount of intermediary equity in the economy is low enough to limit production. Specifically, a constrained social planner can achieve a Pareto improvement by creating long-term rents for intermediaries, which immediately reduces intermediary equity requirements. The constrained-efficient allocation can be implemented by a positive tax on future intermediary activity.