Asymmetric Reciprocity and the Cyclical Behavior of Wages, Effort, and Job Creation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fongoni, Marco
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20200321
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 52-89
• 关键词: equilibrium unemployment; business-cycle; search frictions; reference points; gift exchange; LABOR; fair; RIGIDITY; CONTRACTS; DYNAMICS

摘要

This paper develops a search and matching framework in which workers are characterized by asymmetric reference-dependent rec-iprocity and firms set wages by considering the effect that these can have on workers' effort and, therefore, on output. The cyclical response of effort to wage changes can considerably amplify shocks, independently of the cyclicality of the hiring wage, which becomes irrelevant for unemployment volatility, and firms' expectations of downward wage rigidity in existing jobs increases the volatility of job creation. The model is consistent with evidence on hiring and incumbents' wage cyclicality, and provides novel predictions on the dynamics of effort.