Predation, Protection, and Productivity: A Firm-Level Perspective

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Besley, Timothy; Mueller, Hannes
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20160120
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 184-221
• 关键词: economic incentives; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; crime; countries; origins; MARKET; LABOR

摘要

This paper studies the consequences of predation when firms deploy guard labor as a means of protecting themselves. We build a simple model and combine it with. data for 144 countries from the World Bank enterprise surveys, which ask about firm-level experiences with predation and spending on protection. We use the model to estimate the output loss caused by the misallocation of labor across firms and from production to protection. The loss due to protection effort is substantial and patterns of state protection at the micro level can have a profound impact on aggregate output losses. Various extensions are discussed.