Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friebel, Guido; Kosfeld, Michael; Thielmann, Gerd
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170389
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 59-78
• 关键词: punishment; COOPERATION; ENFORCEMENT; incentives; LAW; preferences; COMPETITION; impatience; time; call

摘要

We conduct experimental games with police applicants in Germany to investigate whether intrinsically motivated agents self-select into this type of public service. Our focus is on trustworthiness and the willingness to enforce norms of cooperation as key dimensions of intrinsic motivation in the police context. We find that police applicants are more trustworthy than non-applicants, i.e., they return higher shares as second-movers in a trust game. Furthermore, they invest more in rewards and punishment when they can enforce cooperation as a third party. Our results provide clear evidence for self-selection of motivated agents into the German police force, documenting an important mechanism that influences the match between jobs and agents in public service.