Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bird, Daniel; Frug, Alexander
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170025
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 111-+
• 关键词: limited-liability

摘要

We study a principal-agent interaction where investments and rewards arrive stochastically over time and are privately observed by the agent. Investments (costly for the agent, beneficial for the principal) can be concealed by the agent. Rewards (beneficial for the agent, costly for the principal) can be forbidden by the principal. We ask how rewards should be used and which investments incentivized. We identify the unique optimal mechanism and analyze the dynamic investment and compensation policies. When all rewards are identical, the unique optimal way to provide incentives is by a carte blanche to pursue all rewards arriving in a predetermined time frame.