Bargaining and Information Acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dong, Miaomiao; Hoshino, Tetsuya
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240034
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 75-102
• 关键词: gathering information; equilibrium; monopoly; auctions; CONTRACT; MODEL

摘要

We consider an ultimatum game where the value of the object being sold to the buyer is high or low. The seller knows the value, but the buyer does not. The value to the seller is zero. We introduce the option for the buyer to acquire costly information after an offer is made. This information either confirms the high value or provides no information. As the cost of information vanishes, the buyer gets all the surplus in a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, although the option to acquire information is never used. Moreover, this signal structure is optimal for the buyer. ( (JEL C72, C78, D82, D83)