Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghosal, S; Miller, M
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00125
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 276-304
• 关键词: model; debt; banking; crises

摘要

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. In the face of sovereign default, the need to give appropriate incentives to the debtor leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures involving increased 'contractibility' of sovereign debtor's payoffs, suspension of convertibility in a 'discovery' phase and penalties in case of malfeasance. In relation to the current debate, this is more akin to the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism than the Collective Action Clauses promoted by others.