Deductive reasoning in extensive games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Asheim, GB; Dufwenberg, M
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00121
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 305-325
• 关键词: perfect-information; backward induction; rationality; rationalizability; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: 'caution', 'full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.