The inefficiency of splitting the bill

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gneezy, U; Haruvy, E; Yafe, H
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00209.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 265-280
• 关键词: Public-goods experiments; free rider problem; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION

摘要

When agents are ascribed selfish motives, economic theory points to grave inefficiencies resulting from externalities. We study a restaurant setting in which groups of diners are faced with different ways of paying the bill. The two main manipulations are splitting the bill between the diners and having each pay individually. We find that subjects consume more when the cost is split, resulting in a substantial loss of efficiency. Diners prefer the individual pay to the inefficient split-bill method. When forced to play according to a less preferred set of rules, they minimise their individual losses by taking advantage of others.