Inequality aversion in a variety of games -: An indirect evolutionary analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guth, Werner; Napel, Stefan
• 署名单位: University of Hamburg; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01122.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1037-1056
• 关键词: fairness; preferences; INFORMATION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environment comprising different games which - studied in isolation - yield opposite implications. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the definition of inequality aversion as well as on agents' ability to discriminate between games.