Reserve prices in auctions as reference points

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W.
• 署名单位: Utrecht University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02044.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 637-653
• 关键词: psychology

摘要

We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where a publicly announced reserve price has some influence on the reference point. It turns out that the seller's optimal reserve price increases with the number of bidders. Also in contrast to the standard model, we find that secret reserve prices can outperform public reserve prices, and that setting the optimal reserve price can be more valuable for the seller than attracting additional bidders.