Does employment protection reduce productivity? Evidence from US states

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Autor, David H.; Kerr, William R.; Kugler, Adriana D.
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02055.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: F189-F217
• 关键词: job security; LABOR; LAW; CONTRACTS; COSTS; WILL

摘要

Theory predicts that mandated employment protection may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. We use the adoption of wrongful-discharge protection by state courts in the US from 1970 to 1999 to evaluate the empirical link between dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Census Bureau, our estimates suggest that wrongful-discharge protection reduces employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, plants engage in capital deepening and experience a decline in total factor productivity, indicative of altered production techniques. Evidence of strong contemporaneous growth in employment, however, leads us to view our findings as suggestive but tentative.