Charity auctions: A field experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carpenter, Jeffrey; Holmes, Jessica; Matthews, Peter Hans
• 署名单位: Middlebury College
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02105.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 92-113
• 关键词: sample selection bias

摘要

Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. We conduct field experiments to see which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all-pay, raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field.