The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Capra, C. Monica; Tanaka, Tomomi; Camerer, Colin F.; Feiler, Lauren; Sovero, Veronica; Noussair, Charles N.
• 署名单位: Emory University; Tilburg University; California Institute of Technology; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Carleton College; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02262.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 977-1009
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; coordination failure; strategic uncertainty; GROWTH; CONVERGENCE; games

摘要

We introduce an experimental approach to study the effect of institutions on economic growth. In each period, agents produce and trade output in a market, and allocate it to consumption and investment. Productivity is higher if total capital stock is above a threshold. The threshold externality generates two steady states - a suboptimal 'poverty trap' and an optimal steady state. In a baseline treatment, the economies converge to the poverty trap. However, the ability to make public announcements or to vote on competing and binding policies, increases output, welfare and capital stock. Combining these two simple institutions guarantees that the economies escape the poverty trap.