RINGLEADERS IN LARGER NUMBER ASYMMETRIC CARTELS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Davies, Stephen; De, Oindrila
• 署名单位: University of East Anglia; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Indore
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12062
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: F524-F544
• 关键词: output quotas; collusion; price; FIRMS

摘要

The concept of a cartel ringleader has specific legal meaning but has received relatively little attention in the economic literature of cartels. This article draws on a sample of 89 European cartels to identify how often ringleaders exist, who they are and what they do. It argues that ringleaders are more likely where the traditional cartel problems' are likely to be most acute, i.e. with larger numbers of members exhibiting substantial size asymmetries. This is confirmed for price-fixing and bid-rigging cartels and is especially pronounced where the ringleader displays aggressive' as opposed to merely organisational' behaviour.