Competition for procurement shares

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alcalde, Jose; Dahm, Matthias
• 署名单位: Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat Rovira i Virgili; Universitat Rovira i Virgili
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 193-208
• 关键词: Procurement auction; affirmative action

摘要

We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows variations in the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even while accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a standard auction format. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.