Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mathevet, Laurent; Taneva, Ina
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.006
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 327-349
• 关键词: Implementation; mechanisms; multiple equilibrium problem; learning; strategic complementarities; supermodular games

摘要

This paper studies supermodular mechanism design in environments with arbitrary (finite) type spaces and interdependent valuations. In these environments, the designer may have to use Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, because ex-post implementation may not be possible. We propose direct (Bayesian) mechanisms that are robust to certain forms of bounded rationality while controlling for equilibrium multiplicity. In quasi-linear environments with informational and allocative externalities, we show that any Bayesian mechanism that implements a social choice function can be converted into a supermodular mechanism that also implements the original decision rule. The proposed supermodular mechanism can be chosen in a way that minimizes the size of the equilibrium set, and we provide two sets of sufficient conditions to this effect. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementation in unique equilibrium. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.