Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McGee, Andrew; Yang, Huanxing
• 署名单位: Simon Fraser University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.001
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 181-191
• 关键词: Cheap talk; multiple senders

摘要

This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiver's ideal action to one sender's private information depends on the other sender's private information. We show that the senders' information transmissions exhibit strategic complementarity: more information transmitted by one sender leads to more information being transmitted by the other sender. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.