Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Buonanno, Paolo; Durante, Ruben; Prarolo, Giovanni; Vanin, Paolo
署名单位:
University of Bergamo; University of Bologna
刊物名称:
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN:
0013-0133
DOI:
10.1111/ecoj.12236
发表日期:
2015
页码:
F175-F202
关键词:
land-reform
crime
population
endowments
PROTECTION
CONFLICT
MARKET
摘要:
With weak law-enforcement institutions, a positive shock to the value of natural resources may increase demand for private protection and opportunities for rent appropriation through extortion, favouring the emergence of mafia-type organisations. We test this hypothesis by investigating the emergence of the mafia in twentieth century Sicily, where a severe lack of state property-rights enforcement coincided with a steep rise in international demand for sulphur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity. Using historical data on the early incidence of mafia activity and on the distribution of sulphur reserves, we document that the mafia was more present in municipalities with greater sulphur availability.