A foundation for strategic agenda voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 91-99
• 关键词: Strategic voting; agendas; committees; institutions; axioms

摘要

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.