Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rehbeck, John
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 207-210
• 关键词: Revealed preference; Backwards-induction; rationalizability

摘要

We extend the result from Bossert and Sprumont (2013) that every single-valued choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable via strict preferences to the case of choice correspondences via weak preferences. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.