Please Don't Vote for Me: Voting in a Natural Experiment with Perverse Incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Spenkuch, Joerg L.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12131
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1025-1052
• 关键词: Elections; equilibria; polls

摘要

Whether individuals vote strategically is one of the most important questions at the intersection of economics and political science. Exploiting a flaw in the German electoral system by which a party may gain seats by receiving fewer votes, this article documents patterns of preference misrepresentation in a large, real-world election. During the 2005 elections to the Bundestag, the sudden death of a right-wing candidate necessitated a by-election in one electoral district. Knowing the results in all other districts and given the paradoxical incentives in place, a substantial fraction of the electorate voted for a party other than their most preferred one, or abstained.