Dynamic beliefs

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Macera, Rosario
署名单位:
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
刊物名称:
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN:
0899-8256
DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.003
发表日期:
2014
页码:
1-18
关键词:
Optimal beliefs Anticipatory utility Reference-dependent utility Bonuses incentives
摘要:
This paper studies the temporal path of subjective probability assessments. A reference-dependent agent who experiences utility from anticipation and from changes in this anticipatory emotion makes utility-maximizing assessments about his likelihood of success in a future lottery. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the model predicts that if the lottery is sufficiently valuable, optimism decreases as the payoff date approaches. Intuitively, as time goes by, last-period expected disappointment becomes increasingly important relative to the joy of anticipating a favorable outcome. Applying the model to the optimal timing of productivity bonuses, I find that a decreasing path of beliefs reduces the cost of providing incentives. Thus, optimal bonuses are sizable and are not frequently offered. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.