From Custer to Thermopylae: Last stand behavior in multi-stage contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gelder, Alan
• 署名单位: University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 442-466
• 关键词: Last stand; Dynamic contest; RACE; all-pay auction; Winning momentum

摘要

In a multi-stage contest known as a two-player race, players display two fundamental behaviors: (1) the laggard will make a last stand in order to avoid the cost of losing; and (2) the player who is ahead will defend his lead if it is threatened. Last stand behavior, in particular, contrasts with previous research where the underdog simply gives up. The distinctive results are achieved by introducing losing penalties and discounting into the racing environment. This framework permits the momentum effect, typically ascribed to the winner of early stages, to be more thoroughly examined. I study the likelihood that the underdog will catch up. I find that neck-and-neck races are common when the losing penalty is large relative to the winning prize, while landslide victories occur when the prize is relatively large. Closed-form solutions are given for the case where players have a common winning prize and losing penalty. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.