A Theory of Political Entrenchment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saint-Paul, Gilles; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; Collegio Carlo Alberto
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12215
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1238-1263
• 关键词: congressional voting patterns; positive theory; POLICY; immigration; ECONOMY; IMPACT; performance; persistence; COMPETITION; interests

摘要

Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.