Provision of a Public Good with Multiple Dynasties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karp, Larry
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12458
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2641-2664
• 关键词: renewable resources; climate; ECONOMICS; POLICY; MODEL; sustainability; game

摘要

Because carbon emissions create externalities across countries and generations, climate policy requires international cooperation and intergenerational altruism. A differential game using overlapping generations with intergenerational altruism shows how altruism and cooperation interact, and provides estimates of their relative importance in determining equilibrium steady-state carbon levels. A small increase in cooperation has a larger equilibrium effect than a small increase in altruism, beginning at empirically plausible levels. A large increase in altruism may have a larger equilibrium effect, compared to a large increase in cooperation. Climate investments may be dynamic strategic complements, reducing but not eliminating incentives to free ride.