HEALTH INSURANCE WITHOUT SINGLE CROSSING: WHY HEALTHY PEOPLE HAVE HIGH COVERAGE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boone, Jan; Schottmuller, Christoph
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Copenhagen
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12242
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 84-105
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; advantageous selection; adverse selection; MARKETS; medication; Heterogeneity; expenditure; adults; income

摘要

Standard insurance models predict that people with high risks have high insurance coverage. It is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured. We show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in an insurance model where people choose treatment intensity. We analyse different market structures and show the following: if insurers have market power, the violation of single crossing caused by income differences and endogenous treatment choice can explain the empirically observed outcome. Our results do not rely on differences in risk aversion between types.