Demand Reduction in Multi-object Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pagnozzi, Marco; Saral, Krista J.
• 署名单位: University of Naples Federico II
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12392
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2702-2729
• 关键词: multiunit demand; uniform-price; cheap talk; BEHAVIOR; INFORMATION; english; speculation; electricity; uncertainty; dutch

摘要

We analyse the effects of different resale mechanisms on bidders' strategies in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. Our experiment consists of four treatments: one without resale and three resale treatments that vary the information available and the bargaining mechanism in the resale market. Resale markets induce demand reduction by high-value bidders and speculation by low-value bidders, thus affecting the allocation of the objects on sale. The magnitude of these effects, however, depends on the structure of the resale market. Features of the resale market that tend to increase its efficiency result in lower auction efficiency and seller's revenue.